The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project

Summary:

The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project uses additional support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Ford Foundation to expand and intensify the investigation of governance mechanisms for biotechnology research that was initiated under the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program. Biotechnology is perhaps the ultimate dual-use problem: the same lines of research that might help eradicate many human diseases also could endanger a large portion of humanity if deliberately misused or inadvertently misapplied. This project brings together leading scientists, arms control experts, information technology specialists, lawyers, and industry representatives from the U.S. and abroad to discuss the need for systematic protection against misapplications of biotechnology, and to develop a prototype oversight system in which selective disclosure and review could increase protection without banning beneficial research or imposing excessive secrecy. John Steinbruner is the Principal Investigator, Elisa D. Harris is the Pathogens Project Coordinator, and Nancy Gallagher is responsible for linking concepts and approaches developed for the pathogens application to other elements of the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program.

Jump to Papers

Advanced biotechnology is a prime example of a global problem that cannot be managed solely by national action or traditional arms control techniques. Rapid advances in fundamental science offer the power to intervene in basic life processes and even alter evolution, for good or ill. The long-term consequences of such experiments for public health and security are unknown, but potentially monumental. Efforts to protect against the misuse of biotechnology without impeding beneficial research cannot mirror the access-control arrangements that have kept the most dangerous nuclear technology in the hands of a few governments. The relevant biological organisms, equipment, and knowledge are widely distributed in vibrant medical and agricultural research communities around the world, and are increasingly available even to high school students. Moreover, the threat cannot be reduced to a few mad scientists, suicidal terrorists, or rogue states. Legitimate science can create unintended dangers if a cutting-edge experiment has unexpected results, if findings from research done for benign purposes are misapplied by somebody else, or if the line between defensive and offensive bio-weapon activities becomes blurred in practice or perception. Matching the solution to the problem, therefore, calls for a broad-based effort by the relevant scientific communities to set research standards, to exchange information and monitor each others' behavior, to exercise independent review of high-risk experiments, and to provide the expertise needed for an effective response should somebody operate out of bounds.

This project seeks to stimulate creative thinking and dialogue about the basic elements of what might be called a "protective oversight system" for biotechnology. A response that will do more good than harm should start by identifying which research activities pose the greatest danger, so the oversight system concentrates on the core of the problem and leaves untouched the vast majority of biological research and product development. Although a few known pathogens, such as smallpox, could be true weapons of mass destruction, the devastation that could be caused by existing pathogens pales in comparison to that from a bio-engineered pathogen that was both highly contagious and extremely virulent. But while there might be a few lines of research that should be presumptively precluded in order to avert such a development, most research with highly dangerous pathogens has too much life-saving potential to be banned. Therefore, the basic objective of a protective oversight system should be to provide reassurance that scientists operating in this high risk/high benefit zone pay close attention not only to bio-safety and physical security in their labs, but also to the broader public health and security implications of their research.

A protective oversight system would build on bedrock norms against using the life sciences for destructive purposes. It would harness the means that scientists have traditionally used to generate high-quality knowledge,  the peer review process and the willingness to share research results with other scientists. It would also seek to systematize, standardize, and harmonize the various governmental regulations, reporting requirements, and funding reviews that affect basic research with especially dangerous pathogens in the United States and abroad. Given important differences among the various communities that work with dangerous pathogens, and the complicated mix of private and public interests that must be balanced, an effective protective oversight system would probably combine some forms of voluntary self-governance with more formal rules about the obligations, rights, and protections that should apply to more or less dangerous research activities.

Unlike proposals to ban some research or prevent the publication of dangerous knowledge, a protective oversight would primarily rely on the systematic disclosure of information needed for an independent expert review of high risk/high benefit research proposals and routine monitoring of research activities that could move into this especially dangerous zone. Systematic disclosure for protective oversight is not, however, the same thing as unrestricted publication of preliminary research ideas, proprietary information, or military secrets. Working out the practical details of a protective oversight arrangement involves numerous challenges, such as determining the least burdensome disclosure requirements for satisfactory reassurance about compliance with agreed research standards, and crafting legal protections against the misuse of disclosed information, and determining the appropriate institutional arrangements. Advanced information technologies hold the potential to create very powerful data systems in which information mined from open sources such as journal articles could be combined with restricted-access information disclosed purely for the purpose of protective oversight to provide a comprehensive picture of legitimate research activities and to identify anomalies that might offer early warning of a looming disaster.

Books and Monographs

John D. Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, Stacy M. Okutani, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens, (CISSM, March 2007)

Articles and Op-Eds

Elisa D. Harris, "Dual Use Biotechnology Research: The Case for Protective Oversight", (in Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research, October 2007)

John D. Steinbruner, In the Name of Defence, (The New Scientist, November 2006)

Elisa D. Harris and John Steinbruner, "Scientific Openness and National Security after 9/11", (CBW Conventions Bulletin, March 2005)

John Steinbruner and Stacy Okutani, "The Protective Oversight of Biotechnology", (Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, December 2004)

Elisa D. Harris, "Threat Reduction and North Korea's CBW Programs", (The Nonproliferation Review Fall/Winter, 2004)

Elisa D. Harris, "The Evil Twin of Research: Bioterror", (Los Angeles Times, 03/16/2004)

John Steinbruner and Elisa D. Harris, "Dangerous Research: When Science Breeds Nightmares", (International Herald Tribune, 12/03/2003)

John D. Steinbruner and Elisa D. Harris, "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens", (Issues in Science and Technology, Spring, 2003)

Robert Sprinkle, "The Biosecurity of Trust", (BioScience, vol. 53, no. 3, March 2003)

Elisa D. Harris, "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Prospects and Priorities after 9/11", (The Brookings Review, Summer, 2002)

Elisa D. Harris, "Research Not to be Hidden", (New York Times, 09/06/2001)

Elisa D. Harris, "Bioweapons Treaty: Still a Good Idea", (Christian Science Monitor, 08/24/2001)

John Steinbruner, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Okutani, "A Tough Call", (Arms Control Today, May 2001)

John Steinbruner, "Biological Weapons: A Plague on All Houses", (Foreign Policy, Winter 1997, 1998)

Dissertations

Stacy Okutani, Structuring Biodefense: Legacies and Current Policy Choices, (UMD Dissertation, 2007)

Working Papers

Johnathan Tucker and Stacy Okutani, "Global Governance of 'Contentious' Science: The Case of the World Health Organization's Oversight of Smallpox Virus Research", (Working Paper Prepared for the WMD Commission, December 2004)

Alex Greninger, "The Definition and Measure of Dangerous Research", (CISSM Working Paper, 07/16/2004)

John Steinbruner, "Protective Oversight of Biotechnology", (CISSM Working Paper, 02/11/2002)

Stacy Okutani, "Federal Regulation of Scientific Research", (CISSM Working Paper, 08/23/2001)

Conference Reports, Presentations and Other Documents

Ottorino Cosivi and Emmanuelle Tuerlings, Life Science Research and Global Health Security, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Ruud Valyasevi, Strengthening Oversight Over Dual-use Research in Asia, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

M.C.N. Jayasuriya, Dual-use Research as Related to Sri Lanka, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Tilak R. Shrestha, National Biosafety Framework in Nepal, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Tikki Pang, The World Health Report: A Safer Future, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Isroil Samihardjo, Strengthening Oversight Over Dual-use Research in Asia: Indonesian Perspective, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

John D. Steinbruner, Managing the Promise and Danger of Biotechnology, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Yusuf Zafar, T.I., Development on Dual Use Issues in Pakistan, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Sivramiah Shantharam, The Basic Elements of Dual-Use Research in Life Sciences, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Shahid Jameel, The International Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology and the Dual-Use Issue, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

David Franz, The Dual-Use Dilemma: An International Challenge and Opportunity, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Ajey Lele, Oversight of Dual-Use Research: An Asian Perspective, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, December 2007)

Edison Liu, Keynote Address, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Katsuhisa Furukawa, Challenges of Biosecurity from Japan's Perspective, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

John Steinbruner, Managing The Promise and Danger of Biotechnology, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

John Mackenzie, Emerging Viral Disease in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific: The Importance of Biosecurity and the Dilemma of Dual-Use, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Tikki Pang, WHO Perspectives on Life, Sciene Research and Global Health Security, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Jack Radisch, Biosecurity: Securing Pathogens Against Loss and Theft, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Firoza Burhanudeen, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Song Sang-yong, COMEST's Dream for a Code of Conduct for Scientists, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Nina Gloriani Barzaga, Strengthening Oversight on Dual Use Biotech Research in Asia - The Philippine Perspective, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Takeshi Kurata, Biosafety in Japan, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Bob Mathews, The Indonesia/Australia Biological Weapons Convention Regional Workshop Process: Enhancing Bio-security and Raising the Barriers to Bio-terrorism, (Regional Biosecurity Workshop, Singapore, May 2007)

Elisa D. Harris, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research: Meeting Report, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

Mario Soberon, Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms: Mexican Experience, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

John Steinbruner, Managing the Destructive Potential of Biotechnology, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

Maria Jose Espona, Developments Among International Scientific and Health Bodies on Dual-Use Issue, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

Walter Mendoza, Global Threats and Regional Response: Security and Epidemiological Surveillance in Andean Contries, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

Roberto J. Fernandez, Biosafety and Dual-Use Scientific Research, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

Ana Maria Tapajos, Dual-Use Research, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

Roque Monteleonoe Neto, Dual-Use Research, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Teresopolis, Brazil, December 2006)

John Steinbruner, "The Argument for Oversight: Developments in the US", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Kathryn Nixdorff, "The Basic Problem: Dual-Use Research", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Karl Simpson, "Biosecurity-Terror Versus Nature", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Geoffrey L. Smith, "Royal Society's Work on Dual-Use Issues", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Simone H.C. Scholze, "Towards a Code of Conduct for Scientists?", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Jozsef Furesz, "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

David B. Sawaya, "Biosecurity in the International Futures Programme of the OECD", (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Ottorino Cosivi, Life Science Research: Opportunities and Risks for Public Health, (Presentation at the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research, Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006)

Elisa D. Harris, "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research: Meeting Report", (Matrahaza, Hungary, May 2006, )

Elisa D. Harris, Michael Imperiale, Ottorino Cosivi, Ronald Atlas, John Steinbruner, "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World", (Presentation in the Panel "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World" at American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, St. Louis, 02/18/2006)

Michael Imperiale, "The Role of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity", (Presentation in the Panel "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World" at American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, St. Louis, 02/18/2006)

Ronald Atlas, "Globalizing Biosecurity", (Presentation in the Panel "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World" at American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, St. Louis, 02/18/2006)

Ottorino Cosivi, "Implications of Life Sciences R&D for Global Health Security", (Presentation in the Panel "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World" at American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, St. Louis, 02/18/2006)

John Steinbruner, "The Argument for Oversight", (Presentation in the Panel "Biosecurity Challenges in the Post 9-11 World" at American Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting, St. Louis, 02/18/2006)

John Steinbruner, "The Protective Oversight of Highly Consequential Biological Research", (Prepared for the Biosafety Parallel Session, International High-Level Forum on Bioeconomy, Beijing, China, 09/14/2005)

Elisa D. Harris, "Biological Threat Reduction: Opportunities and Obstacles", (Presentation before the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 05/20/2005)

Elisa D. Harris, "Outlawing Chemical and Biological Weapons", (presentation at The Paul C. Warnke Conference on the Past, Present and Future of Arms Control, 01/28/2004)

Elisa D. Harris, "Another Approach to Controlling Dangerous Pathogens", (Presentation at a symposium on National Security and Biological Research: "Where are the Boundaries?" The New York Academy of Sciences, 11/11/2003)

Elisa D. Harris, "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens", (Statement at the BWC Meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland, 08/18/2003)

Elisa D. Harris, "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens", (Presentation at the BWC Meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland, 08/18/2003)

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