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The Reconsidering the Rules for Space ProjectSummary: U.S. moves to reject the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, build a national missile defense, and develop offensive space weapons underscore a stark choice between competition or cooperation as the basis for space operations. Space is increasingly important to commerce in the information age, to the management of global environmental problems, and to the revolution in military affairs. It is a leading application for the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program because the vulnerability of space assets makes competitive weaponization superficially attractive, but ultimately unwise. In collaboration with the Committee on International Security Studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, CISSM is exploring operational rules and transparency measures that could be used to balance the interests of commercial, civilian, and military constituencies in the United States and other major space-faring countries. Description: For nearly fifty years, the United States promoted a vision of space as a place controlled by no country and meant to benefit all. Commercial activities and scientific exploration could occur freely as long as nobody else's interests were harmed. To protect its use of space for reconnaissance, arms control verification, early warning, and other support for terrestrial security activities, the United States worked to outlaw space-based weapons of mass destruction, to avoid the deployment of other space-based weapons, and to restrain the development of anti-satellite capabilities. Now the United States appears to be abandoning its de facto "space sanctuary" policy and seeking space dominance as a way to protect increasingly important commercial and military space assets. USSPACECOM Vision for 2020, for example, argued that the only way to prevent a surprise attack on U.S. satellites is to develop the ability to "see anything, anytime," to deploy worldwide missile defense, to develop space-based weapons, to be able to protect militarily all U.S. space assets, and to deny similar capabilities to any competitor. The U.S. decision to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on June 13, 2002 without negotiating other limits on national missile defense or committing to any specific forms of international cooperation underscores a fundamental shift away from international agreement on a basic framework for space activities, and toward a situation where the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must - unless they can find an asymmetrical way to protect their interests. Of the major space-faring countries, China has said most explicitly that U.S. pursuit of SPACECOM's vision would be intolerably threatening and would require a countervailing response. Even a limited national missile defense could neutralize China's minimal nuclear deterrent. U.S. use of space for highly intrusive surveillance and force-enhancement, let alone force application or coercive diplomacy short of war, would have serious implications for the Taiwan situation. Chinese officials have clearly indicated that their preferred response to an aggressively imposing U.S. military program is not to enter a classic arms race, but to put pressure on points of weakness, such as vulnerable space assets. China's delegate to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has bluntly pointed out that the existing legal rules regarding the military use of space are partial and fragile. Military support activities and related commercial services are protected from interference under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty under the supposition that their purposes are fundamentally peaceful. U.S. pursuit of the SPACECOM vision would not be peaceful, in China's view, and would therefore remove the legal protection currently accorded to space assets. In other words, China is warning that U.S. attempts to weaponize space would jeopardize commercial and military support activities. The result would not be U.S. space dominance, but a chaotic situation that left everybody less secure. The alternative is to develop a more refined and robust set of rules for space that balances the interests of commercial, civilian, and military constituencies in the United States and abroad. Any attempt to use traditional arms control methods to control offensive space capabilities quickly runs into two dual-use problems: (1) hitting a satellite is much easier than hitting a fast-moving missile, so even a rudimentary missile defense system will have more powerful ASAT capabilities; and (2) any country that can place an object in space has at least residual capabilities to threaten the space activities of others. Thus, protective rules will have to place more emphasis on operational practice than on denying inherent capability. Moreover, it is doubtful that the United States could establish effective rules against interference with its space-based military support and force enhancement capabilities without clearer understandings about how far these activities could go and still be considered "peaceful" under the Outer Space Treaty. There are also a host of transparency issues to consider in balancing commercial, civilian, and military interests, such as whether there should be international agreement regarding the sale of commercial satellite imagery in conflict situations, and how international cooperation on commercial space launch activities can proceed without raising concerns about the proliferation of advanced ballistic missile technology. Books and Monographs Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security, (American Academy of Arts and Sciences Monograph, 2008) David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual, (American Academy of Arts and Sciences Monograph, 2005) Articles and Op-Eds Ram Jakhu, "Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space", (Journal of Space Law 32, no. 1, 31-110, Summer, 2006) Nancy Gallagher, "Approaches to Regulating Weapons in Space", (in Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space—Conference Report, 21–22 March 2005, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland, March 2006) Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman, and Jeffrey Lewis, "U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus", (The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 13, Number 1, March 2006) Nancy Gallagher, "Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules of Space Security", (in John Logsdon and Audrey Schaffer, eds., Perspectives on Space Security, George Washington University, Elliot School of International Affairs; Washington, D.C., December 2005) Jeffrey Lewis, "Engage China, Engage the World", (Ad Astra 17:2, April/June, 2005) Nina Tannenwald, "Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space", (Yale Journal of International Law, Summer, 2004) Theresa Hitchens and Jeffrey Lewis, "Arms Race in Space? U.S. Air Force Quietly Focuses on Space Control", (Defense News, September 2003) Jeffrey Lewis, "Rumsfeld Aims for the Stars: An Arms Control Alternative to the Pentagon's Plan in Space", (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, February 2002) John Steinbruner, "NMD and the Wistful Pursuit of Common Sense", (National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer, 2000) Working Papers Jaganath Sankaran, Requirements and Feasibility for the Transition from a Ballistic Missile Capability to an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Capability, (CISSM Working Paper, December 2007) Xavier Pasco, "A European Approach to Space Security", (CISSM Working Paper, July 2006) Robert D. Lamb, "Satellites, Security, and Scandal: Understanding the Politics of Export Control", (CISSM Working paper, January 2005) Jeffrey Lewis, "Lift-Off for Space Weapons? Implications of the Department of Defense's 2004 Budget Request for Space Weaponization", (CISSM Working Paper, 07/23/2003) John Steinbruner, "The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance", (Occasional Paper of the Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, July 2001) Conference Reports, Presentations and Other Documents Jeffrey Lewis, "Autonomous Proximity: A Coming Collision in Orbit?", (Issue Brief, December 2004) |
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland