Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections: Economics, Politics, and Foreign Affairs

Publication Date: 
February 2016
Description: 

CISSM Report

Project: 
The Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program
The Program for Public Consultation
Document Type: 
Articles and Op-Eds

The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has been conducting a series of studies about Iranian and American public opinion to explore how public attitudes might be affecting the negotiation, ratification, and implementation of the JCPOA. This study repeats many of the questions asked in previous surveys of Iranian public opinion conducted with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) and Iranpoll.com, an independent Toronto-based polling company. The July 2014 study focused on what types of limitations and transparency measures the Iranian public might be willing to place on Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. The May 2015 study assessed Iranian public attitudes toward the framework for a deal that negotiators made public before they worked out the detailed provisions of the JCPOA. The September 2015 study explored what the Iranian public thought about the agreement reached on July 14 of that year, including how understanding of the terms and expectations regarding sanctions relief affected attitudes toward the JCPOA, the leaders who had negotiated it, and Rouhani’s foreign policy of equitable cooperation with the West.

This study also includes many new questions to explore how implementation of the deal, and simultaneous debates in the U.S. Congress about imposing new sanctions on Iran for other reasons, might be influencing Iranian attitudes about working with the United States on other problems, like terrorism and civil violence in the Middle East. In addition to repeating a question asked previously about cooperating to help the government of Iraq counter ISIS, we probed extensively into Iranian attitudes towards ISIS and other non-state actors in the region, toward various forms of involvement by Iran and other countries in Syria, and toward current diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Syria and concentrate international military action on defeating ISIS.

Full Report | Questionnaire and Frequency Tables


Summary of Findings

1. Views of the Rouhani Administration
President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif enjoy high levels of popular support in Iran. Nearly 8 in 10 Iranians say they have a favorable opinion of Rouhani and Zarif. Yet the intensity of their popularity has substantially eroded since August 2015. With Iran’s parliamentary elections only about a month away, 6 in 10 Iranians continue to want Rouhani supporters to win, while a growing minority favors his critics. Though Rouhani receives high marks for improving Iran’s security and deepening Iran’s relations with European countries, views of the economy are mixed. An increasing majority of Iranians think that Rouhani has not been successful in reducing unemployment. Iranians are also substantially less optimistic about Iran’s economy, with less than half now thinking that the economy is getting better.

2. Iran’s February 2016 Parliamentary Elections
Four in ten Iranians voice confidence that the upcoming Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) elections will be very fair, and another four in ten assume it will be somewhat free and fair. Two thirds are highly confident they will vote in the upcoming elections for the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts. The most important issues Iranians want the new Majlis to tackle are unemployment and Iran’s low performing economy.  

3. Civil Liberties in Iran
Two in three Iranians believe that it is important for President Rouhani to seek to increase civil liberties in Iran. However, only a small minority complains that Iranians have too little freedom. While only about a third thinks that civil liberties in Iran have increased during Rouhani’s presidency, a plurality expects that civil liberties will increase at least somewhat over the next two years.

4. Approval for Nuclear Deal
Seven in ten Iranians approve of the nuclear deal, though enthusiasm has waned somewhat. The deal garners support from majorities of those who favor Rouhani’s critics in the Majlis election, as well as those who favor his supporters. Two thirds still think the Iranian leadership negotiated a good deal for Iran, though the number of those disagreeing has risen to one in five. The number who believes it was a win for Iran has also declined, while the number who believes it was a victory for both sides has risen and is now a majority.

5. Perceptions of the Nuclear Deal
Substantial numbers of Iranians now have a more accurate picture of the deal than they did in August 2015. About half (up from a third) now realizes that Iran has accepted limits on its nuclear research. Almost half (up from a quarter) now knows that many US sanctions are not covered by the agreement and will continue. However, growing majorities continue to believe incorrectly that Iranian military sites cannot be inspected under any conditions. A majority also believes that the US has agreed to not impose new sanctions to replace the ones that were removed as part of the nuclear deal.

6. Expectations of Economic Benefits
Three in five Iranians expect that the nuclear deal will eventually result in improvements in their own economic well-being. This sentiment is shared by a majority of those who support Rouhani’s critics in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Majorities expect to see, within a year, better access to medical products from abroad, more foreign investment, and significant improvements in unemployment and the overall economy, though these majorities have declined from August 2015.

7. The Nuclear Deal’s Effect on Iran’s Foreign Relations
A large majority of Iranians thinks that Iran’s relations with European countries have already improved as a result of the nuclear deal, but only one in three thinks Iran’s relations with the United States have improved.

8. Views of US Cooperation in the Nuclear Deal
Six in ten Iranians are not confident that the US will live up to its obligations under the nuclear agreement and do not think the US will accept other countries cooperating with Iran’s civilian nuclear sector, as provided for under the deal. Half assume the US will use pressure and sanctions to extract more concessions from Iran—up from only a quarter in August 2015.

9. Views of the Nuclear Program
Just as in past years, four in five Iranians see the development of an Iranian nuclear program as very important, and three in four see this program as being for purely peaceful purposes. Four in five continue to favor the idea of a Middle East nuclear-free zone that would require all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, not to have nuclear weapons.

10. Iran’s Involvement in Syria and Fighting ISIS
Large majorities of Iranians approve of Iran being involved in Syria and strongly support countering ISIS, preserving Iran’s influence in the region, and countering Saudi, American, and Israeli influence. Overwhelming majorities approve of Iran fighting ISIS directly. Large majorities also approve of Iran supporting Shiite and Kurdish groups fighting ISIS and providing support to Iranian allies in the region. Strengthening the Assad government gets more modest support and is seen as a secondary goal for Iran. Two in three Iranians approve of sending Iranian military personnel to help Assad fight against armed Syrian rebels, including ISIS.

11. Views of US Involvement in Syria
A large majority of Iranians disapproves of US involvement in Syria. US involvement in Syria is widely perceived as being primarily motivated by a desire to topple the Assad government, to increase US influence and power in the region, to protect Israeli and Saudi interests, and to decrease Iran’s influence and power in the region. Views are divided about whether the United States is seeking to protect Syrian civilians, to end the conflict, to prevent the conflict from spreading, or to fight ISIS. A modest majority says US efforts against ISIS are not at all sincere. A bare majority supports direct cooperation with the United States to counter ISIS in Iraq.

12. Views of Other Nations Involved in Syria
Large majorities of Iranians approve of the involvement in Syria of Russia and Hezbollah, and seven in ten express confidence that Russia’s efforts against ISIS are sincerely motivated. However, large majorities disapprove of the involvement in Syria of Turkey, France, and, especially, Saudi Arabia. Large majorities say that the Saudis’ efforts against ISIS are insincere; views of the sincerity of the efforts by Turkey and France are less negative. A large majority has a negative view of Saudi efforts to create a coalition against terrorism, primarily because Saudi Arabia is seen as a supporter of ISIS.

13. International Collaboration on Syria and ISIS
Despite their suspicions of other countries operating in the region, eight in ten Iranians approve of Iran participating in the international talks on the conflict in Syria. Of those who know about the Vienna agreement, seven in ten approve of it.

14. Views of Other Countries
Iranians view their country’s allies, notably Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah, favorably, and view Saudi Arabia and Turkey increasingly unfavorably. Views of Russia and China are generally favorable and have improved considerably over time. Western countries, with the exception of Germany, are viewed unfavorably, with Britain and the US viewed negatively by large majorities in Iran. In contrast, a majority has a favorable opinion of the American people.