This paper analyzes the 1988 India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations and facilities, examining its origins, implementation, and implications through declassified documents, primary sources, news reports, and interviews. While some view this agreement as a model for protecting nuclear facilities during conflicts and others question its effectiveness, this research reveals that the agreement successfully maintains a crucial balance between reassurance and deterrence. The study demonstrates that both nations have consistently complied with the agreement during peace and conflict, as it aligns with their strategic interests without compromising deterrence stability. The agreement has yielded significant benefits, including reduced fears of nuclear attacks, improved bilateral relations, international diplomatic gains, and cost-effective security measures for nuclear installations. The paper proposes two supplementary measures to enhance the agreement's effectiveness: establishing a Bilateral Consultative Commission for addressing implementation issues and creating a bilateral instrument specifically prohibiting cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities. This analysis contributes to the broader understanding of arms control theory by validating the complementary yet opposing relationship between arms control arrangements and nuclear deterrence operations, while offering valuable lessons for securing nuclear sites globally.
School Authors: Nasir Mehmood